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A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS IN COASTAL 
FISHERIES: CONTENDING PRESCRIPTIONS FOR 
CONSERVATION, AND THE CASE OF THE ATLANTIC 
BLUE FIN TUNA 
Patrick A. Nickler* 
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
(ICCAT) has recommended, in light of severe stress on the Atlantic 
Ocean's population of bluefin tuna that, for the indefinite future, no 
commercial fishing for juvenile fish of this species be allowed. Concur-
rently, Congress has set out specific monitoring requirements for the 
catch Atlantic bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act in 
order to facilitate conservation of the species. This Comment examines 
the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) implementation of 
these requirements and concludes that the current management system 
is particularly ineffective with respect to the recreational Atlantic blue-
fin tuna fishery, and should be replaced with an overall system more 
similar to the one currently used in the commercial fishery. 
The oceans of the world continue to SUffer from the survival of the 
philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automat-
ically to the shibboleth of the ''freedom of the seas." Professing to believe 
in the "inexhaustible resources of the oceans," they bring species after 
species of fish and whales closer to extinction.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The tragedy of the commons provides a framework for under-
standing the growth of the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery, the decrease 
in the number of Atlantic bluefin tuna, and the failure of the govern-
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1998-1999. 
I want to thank Bill Henchy for his assistance in writing this note and Professor Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater for his valuable suggestions. 
I Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCI., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243, 1245. 
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ment to manage the fishery effectively.2 Garrett Hardin set out the 
tragedy of the commons framework to explain the decline of resources 
held in common with other people.s Hardin's analysis focuses on a 
pasture that herders use in common for grazing their cattle.4 There 
are no problems with the common usage of the pasture until the 
number of animals reaches the carrying capacity of the pasture.5 In 
order to gain extra profits, herders add additional animals to the 
common pasture.6 The problem is that each additional animal means 
more grazing in the pasture, and the continual addition of animals 
eventually leads to overgrazing of the pasture.7 The end result is the 
destruction of the pasture.8 In the words of Hardin, "[e]ach man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit-in a world that is limited."9 
Fisheries are similar to Hardin's pasture in that increased fishing 
pressure has caused certain stocks of fish to become overfished to a 
point that threatens the survival of the fishery.lO An overfished fishery 
is one where the level of fish caught jeopardizes the capacity of the 
fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield. l1 Hardin's frame-
work is important as it underscores the need for outside regulation of 
fishery resources so as to prevent a "tragedy of the commons."l2 The 
way to accomplish this regulation is through the creation of a system 
that "coerces" people into following the regulations. ls 
2 See id.; 57 Fed. Reg. 17,872, 17,873 (1992). 
3 See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. 
4 See id. 
S See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
S See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. 
9 [d. at 1243. 
10 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(2) 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
11 See id. § 1802(29). The Magnuson-Stevens Act does not define maximum sustainable yield. 
See id. However, NMFS defined maximum sustainable yield as "the largest average annual 
catch or yield that can be taken over a significant period of time from each stock under prevailing 
ecology and environmental conditions." See Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Brennan, 958 F.2d 
930,934 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). This definition, however, is no longer contained in the Code of Federal 
Regulations as Congress changed all references to optimum yield. See 16 U.S.C. § 1812; 50 
C.F.R. § 285.2 (1998). 
12 See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. 
13 See id. 
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The V nited States, through the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS),14 uses two separate systems to monitor the catch of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna,I5 essentially meaning that there are two separate sys-
tems for coercing people into following the fishing regulations. In the 
commercial fishery, Atlantic bluefin tuna dealers must tag individual 
fish and file landing reports within twenty-four hours of landing.16 On 
the other hand, in the recreational fishery there is no use of dealer 
tagging, but only a requirement of telephone reporting by recrea-
tional fishers.17 The telephone reporting system is theoretically sup-
plemented by the results of dockside surveys.1S 
This Comment examines the V.S. implementation of the recommen-
dations of the International Commission for the Conservation of At-
lantic Tunas recommendations (ICCAT), and argues that while the 
method of implementation used in the commercial Atlantic bluefin 
tuna fishery satisfies the requirements of the Atlantic Tunas Conven-
tion Act,19 the implementation of the Act's requirements in the rec-
reational fishery fails to meet these requirements. 
I. FISHERIES AS A PART OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS 
Historically, humans have implicitly considered oceanic fish stocks 
as part of a global commons belonging to no person or nation, moving 
where they will on the high seas and coastal waters, and seemingly 
inexhaustible as a resource taken for granted or granted (by God) for 
the taking.20 National regulation of fishery resources occurs within the 
territorial waters of individual coastal nations, as those nations have 
total control over any resources found within their territorial waters.21 
The United States defines its territorial waters as 200 miles beyond 
the seaward boundary of each of the coastal states, and refers to this 
14 NMFS is a component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration where it 
provides management, research, and services for the protection and use of marine resources. 
See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, 1998 CONSERVATION DIRECTORY 16 (43d ed. 1998). 
15 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. Supp.2d 189, 193 (D. Mass. 1998). 
16 See id.; 50 C.F.R. §§ 285.29, 285.30. 
17 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 194; 50 C.F.R. § 285.29. 
18 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 194. 
19 See Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 970-971k (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
20 See generally Karen Hopfl, Go Fish! Individual Transferable Quotas and International 
Possibilities in the South Pacific, 8 COL. J. OF INTL ENVTL. L. & POLICY 137, 137 (1997). 
21 See WILLlAM T. BURKE, THE NEW LAW OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 
AND BEYOND 2 (1994). 
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area as the exclusive economic zone.22 Beyond territorial waters, 
fishery resources belong to no one.23 As a result, anyone can harvest 
such resources without restraint.24 
A fishery that exists outside of territorial waters is an open-access 
system, much the same way that Hardin's pasture is an open-access 
system.25 An open-access system is a system to which all have access; 
it is a property right shared with people of all nations.26 In an open-
access fishery system everyone has an unrestricted right to fish.27 This 
concept is one of the oldest traditions of fishing.28 
An open-access system traditionally follows a four-step pattern of 
development: (1) discovery; (2) expansion; (3) overexploitation; and 
(4) collapse.29 Fishers in an open-access system partake in a "race to 
fish" -each attempting to catch as many fish as economically feasi-
ble.30 During this "race to fish," fishers overcapitalize by investing in 
fleets that have the capacity to catch more fish than are available in 
the fishery.31 This overfishing eventually results in a decreased popu-
lation of fish, below the maximum sustainable yield, and may cause 
the commercial extinction of particular species of fish.32 
II. THE ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA 
A. Description 
The Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus thynnus)33 is one of at 
least a dozen tuna and tuna-like species regulated by international 
22 See id. at 1; Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1802(11) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
23 See BURKE, supra note 21, at 2. 
24 See id. at 3. 
25 See id.; Hopfi, supra note 20, at 143; Peter H. Pearse, From Open Access to Private 
Property: Recent Innovations in Fishing Rights as Instruments of Fisheries Policy, 23 OCEAN 
DEV. & INTL L. 71, 72 (1992). 
26 See Pearse, supra note 25, at 72. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Hopfi, supra note 20, at 143. 
30 See Anthony D. Scott, Conceptual Origins of Rights Based Fishing, in RIGHTS BASED 
FISHING 11, 27 (Philip A. Neher et aI. eds., 1988). 
31 See Hopfi, supra note 20, at 143. 
32 See Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Thmorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System 
of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 382-83 
(1995). 
33 See F.J. MATHER ET AL., HISTORICAL DOCUMENT: LIFE HISTORY AND FISHERIES OF 
ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA 1 (1995). 
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agreement.34 Atlantic bluefin tuna are migratory fish, capable of trans-
versing the Atlantic Ocean within a few months.35 Their migrations 
range from the Labrador Peninsula to Uruguay in the western Atlan-
tic, while in the eastern Atlantic the tuna range from the Mediterra-
nean Sea to Sierra Leone.36 Atlantic bluefin tuna are among the larg-
est bony fish, weighing over 1200 pounds and reaching lengths of over 
ten feet.37 They are also a long-lived fish species, as their lifespan can 
exceed thirty years.38 
The United States categorizes Atlantic bluefin tuna according to 
their size: 
Young School: less than 27 inches; less than 14 pounds 
School: 27 to 47 inches; 14 to 66 pounds 
Large School: 47 to 59 inches; 66 to 135 pounds 
Small Medium: 59 to 73 inches; 135 to 235 pounds 
Large Medium: 73 to 81 inches; 235 to 310 pounds 
Giant: 81 inches or greater; 310 pounds or greater.39 
Out of these categories, only large-medium and giant sized Atlantic 
bluefin tunas may be sold commercially,40 and no one may catch and 
retain young-school sized Atlantic bluefin tunas for any purpose.41 
B. Political Classification 
Congress classified Atlantic bluefin tuna as a "highly migratory 
species" in the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Man-
agement Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act).42 This definition limited 
"highly migratory species" to tuna species, marlin, oceanic sword-
fishes, oceanic sharks, sailfishes, and swordfish.43 Included in the Mag-
nuson-Stevens Act's definition of tuna species is the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna.44 This classification, however, is political rather than biological 
34 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1329. 
35 See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
AN ASSESSMENT OF ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA 5 (1994). 
36 See David C. Hoover, A Case Against International Management of Highly Migratory 
Marine Fishery Resources: The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 11, 14 
(1983). 
37 See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA, supra note 35, at 5. 
38 See id. 
39 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.26 (1998). 
40 See id. § 285.34(a). 
41 See id. § 285.31(a)(33). 
42 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1802(20), 
(39) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
43 See id. § 1802(20). 
44 See id. § 1802(39). 
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as a number of fish species migrate far greater distances than those 
designated as "highly migratory species."45 The reason for the narrow 
definition of "highly migratory species" is that political interest is 
limited to tuna and tuna-like species, because these species are har-
vested commercially.46 Furthermore, tuna and tuna-like species are 
singled out because they support major fisheries and are among the 
most highly valued marine resources.47 Nevertheless, the interna-
tional community also categorizes tuna species as "highly migratory 
species."48 
C. Two-stock Theory of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Migration 
The current theory used in allocating tuna quotas is that there are 
two stocks of Atlantic bluefin tuna.49 One stock is in the western 
Atlantic, while the other is in the eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean.50 
The premise for this two-stock theory is that only limited mixing of 
western Atlantic bluefin tuna and eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean 
bluefin tuna occurs.51 Under this two-stock theory, the western Atlan-
tic stock spawns in the Gulf of Mexico and then migrates to the 
western Atlantic from Cape Hatteras to Newfoundland, while the 
eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean stock spawns in the Mediterranean 
and then migrates to the eastern Atlantic from the Bay of Biscay to 
Norway.52 The main problem with this two-stock theory is that there 
is evidence of transatlantic mixing between the stocks in years of 
strong west winds.53 
Recent scientific data on transatlantic crossings suggests that a 
better hypothesis is that there is a single stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna 
45 See BURKE, supra note 21, at 200. 
46 See id. 
47 See S. REP. No. 101-414, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6276, 6278. At the time this 
definition was enacted, the Senate noted that over the last two decades landings of commercially 
important tuna species had increased about six percent each year. See id. Furthermore, this 
definition was part of a long-term U.S. policy of negotiating international agreements for 
managing and securing accession of U.S. fishers to highly migratory stocks of tunas. See id. at 
3-4, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6279. This policy is necessary because of the highly 
migratory nature of the fish. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6279. 
48 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 34, at 1329. 
49 See DOUGLAS WHYNOTT, GlANT BLUEFIN 18 (1995); COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ATLANTIC 
BLUEFIN TuNA, supra note 35, at 11. 
50 See WHYNOTT, supra note 49, at 18; COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA, 
supra note 35, at 11. 
5! See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA, supra note 35, at 11. 
52 See WHYNOTT, supra note 49, at 18. 
63 See id. 
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in the North Atlantic, with at least two spawning areas.54 Evidence 
of transatlantic crossings creates additional problems for the manage-
ment of Atlantic bluefin tuna, as there is currently not enough bio-
logical information to determine the maximum sustainable yield.55 
D. Economic Interest in the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
The commercial bluefin tuna fishery developed after World War II.56 
However, it was not until 1958 that commercial purse seining began.57 
This development of commercial purse seine fishing corresponded 
with the greatest development of the bluefin tuna fishery. 58 
Purse seine fishing includes the use of spotter aircraft to locate 
schools of tuna.59 Upon finding tuna, a ship discharges a skiff that 
encircles the school with a net.60 The skiff then returns the net to the 
main boat where a fisher purses the net at the bottom, by drawing a 
line attached to the net by rings.61 This action envelops the school, 
allowing both the net and the fish to be brought on board the ship.62 
Many U.S. fishers are engaging in a "race to the resource."63 They 
see Atlantic bluefin tuna as an important export, especially since a 
single fish might be worth as much as $50,000.64 Congress shares the 
view that all fish are important exports.65 In the Fish and Seafood 
Promo~ion Act of 1986, Congress stated that the fishing industry had 
the potential to expand its contribution to foreign commerce, which 
would favorably affect the balance of trade.66 
The Atlantic bluefin tuna is a valuable commercial harvest, which 
is the main reason for political interest in the fish. 67 The Atlantic 
bluefin tuna is the most valuable of the tunas-in fact, because of its 
extremely high-end market in Japan for gourmet consumption in 
54 See COMMI'ITEE TO REVIEW ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA, supra note 35, at 109. 
66 See id. at 110. 
66 See J. L. KASK, TuNA-A WORLD RESOURCE 2 (1972). 
67 See id. at 5. 
58 See id. at 2. 
59 See Hoover, supra note 36, at 14. 
60 See id. 
6! See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See Tipton, supra note 32, at 382-83. 
64 See WHYNOTT, supra note 49, at 5-6. 
65 See Fish and Seafood Promotion Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 4001(7) (1994). 
68 See id. 
67 See BURKE, supra note 21, at 200; Debora MacKenzie, Tho little too late to save the Atlantic 
bluejin, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 23,1993, at 11. 
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sushi and sashimi, it is the most expensive fish in the world.68 In 1993, 
tuna destined for the Japanese market sold for $250 per kilogram on 
the docks, and a single fish may weigh up to 700 kilograms.69 In that 
year, the U.S. commercial fishery landed over 3.5 million pounds of 
bluefin tuna, valued at nearly $22 million.70 There is, however, a great 
deal of fluctuation in the value of Atlantic bluefin tuna. For example, 
in October 1998, the value of Atlantic bluefin tuna was around five 
dollars a pound.71 
Because of the commercial value of the Atlantic bluefin tuna, stocks 
of the fish have continued to decline in recent years.72 Stocks of the 
western Atlantic bluefin tuna have fallen ninety percent since 1975.73 
Given this level of decline, even with full protection of the fish, it 
would take more than a decade for stocks to recover to 19751evels.74 
Atlantic bluefin tuna take eight years to mature to large-medium 
sized fish.76 Scientists believe that the decline in the number of larger 
sized bluefin tuna can be attributed to the high volume of juvenile 
bluefin tuna caught.76 The problem is that fishers catch so many juve-
nile bluefin tunas that there are none left to mature.77 
III. THE REGULATION SYSTEM FOR THE ATLANTIC BLUEFIN 
TuNA FISHERY 
A. International Regulations 
1. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
Treaty 
International management of tuna and tuna-like species began with 
the signing of the International Convention for the Conservation of 
68 See MacKenzie, supra note 67, at 11. 
69 See id. 
70 See S. REP. No. 104-91, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 425, 428. 
71 See Steven Liesman, Why Cape Codders Speak Bad Japanese and Sing the Blues-Japan's 
Taste/or Choice Tuna Fades, and Fishermen Gaze Longing to the East, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 
1998, at AI. Although no one is certain what causes this price fluctuation, a popular theory for 
the 1998 drop in price is a recession in Japan. See id. 
72 See MacKenzie, supra note 67, at 11. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See F.J. MATHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 133. As for sexual maturity, most Atlantic bluefin 
tuna begin spawning when they are between five and seven years old. See id. at 134. 
76 See id. at 1; 57 Fed. Reg. 17,872, 17,873 (1992). 
77 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,873. 
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Atlantic Tuna.78 Many nations recognized that, since the 1970s, there 
had been a constant decline of both the spawning stock and biomass 
of the western Atlantic bluefin tuna.79 Responding to the increased 
exploitation of tuna in the Atlantic Ocean, the United States, along 
with sixteen other nations, signed the treaty in Rio de Janeiro on May 
14,1966.80 The treaty signatories believed that an international regu-
latory body would provide better management of migratory species, 
such as the Atlantic bluefin tuna, than individual nations.8! 
The goal in creating ICCAT was to provide a rational management 
program based on scientific research and restraint.B2 Under this pro-
gram the ICCAT Commission recommends quotas that permit the 
largest sustainable catch.83 The United States set up a process for 
implementing ICCAT recommendations with the passage of the At-
lantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975.84 
The treaty creating ICCAT provides for the creation of a Commis-
sion as the decision-making organ.85 The Commission conducts scien-
tific research including the effects of natural and human factors on the 
abundance of tuna and tuna-like species.86 Then, based on the scientific 
data gathered, the Commission makes recommendations to the mem-
ber nations for actions to maintain tuna populations at levels permit-
ting the maximum sustainable yield.87 
One commentator noted that ICCAT has been ineffective in revers-
ing the trend of declining tuna stocks.88 One of the reasons for this is 
that not all nations fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna became signatories 
to the treaty, therefore, they are not bound to follow the recommenda-
tions of the Commission.89 Recognizing this problem, ICCAT adopted 
the Action Plan to Ensure the Effectiveness of the Conservation 
78 See International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, May 14, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 
293; S. REP. No. 94-269, at 3-4 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 743. 
79 See Center for Marine Conservation v. Brown, No. 92-2471,1993 WL 108944, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 29, 1993). 
80 See S. REP. No. 94-269, at 3 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 743. 
8\ See Hopfl, supra note 20, at 157 n.132. 
82 See S. REP. No. 94-269, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 743. 
83 See Center for Marine Conservation, 1993 WL 108944, at *l. 
84 See id.; Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-971i (1994). 
85 See S. REP. No. 94-269, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 743. 
86 See id. at 4, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 743-44. 
87 See id. at 4, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 744. 
88 See Christopher M. Weld, Critical Evaluation of Existing Mechanisms for Managing 
Highly Migratory Species in the Atlantic Ocean, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INTL L. 285, 294 (1989). 
89 See id. 
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Program for the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna.90 This program authorized the 
use of multilateral trade measures against nonmember parties who 
act in ways that compromise the conservation and management ob-
jectives of ICCAT.91 ICCAT accomplishes this through a three-step 
process that leads to import bans from countries that are not mem-
bers of ICCAT.92 The first step is to identify vessels that harvest tuna 
in a way that diminishes the effectiveness of the ICCAT quota sys-
tem.93 The second step is a request from ICCAT to the nonmember 
nation to stop undermining the conservation program.94 Finally, if the 
nonmember nation does not cease its activities within one year, IC 
CAT will recommend that member nations impose prohibitions on the 
import of Atlantic bluefin tuna from the nonmember nation.95 As of 
February 1999, ICCAT has placed trade restrictions on Panama, Be-
lize, and Honduras.96 
B. Domestic Regulation 
There are two statutes that require NMFS to regulate the Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fishery. These statutes are the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
and the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.97 
1. Magnuson-Stevens Act 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act is the primary legislation for managing 
domestic fisheries within the exclusive economic zone.98 Under the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, NMFS and eight regional fishery manage-
ment councils may develop fishery management plans to manage 
domestic fishery resources.99 In the case of the Atlantic bluefin tuna, 
there is an express statutory requirement that NMFS prepare a 
fishery management plan for the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.loo 
90 See Christopher J. Carr, Recent Developments in Compliance and Enforcementfor Inter-
national Fisheries, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 847, 857 (1997). 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 858. 
94 See id. 
96 See Carr, supra note 90, at 858. 
96 See ICCAT, RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING BLUEFlN CONSERVATION (visited Apr. 7, 1999) 
<http://www.iccat.es/conserm.htm>. 
97 See 64 Fed. Reg. 3154, 3155 (1999). 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1854(g)(1) 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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At the time of this Comment's pUblication no fishery management 
plan for the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery has been issued. On January 
20, 1999, however, NMFS proposed a draft fishery management plan 
for the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. 101 Under the proposed plan, 
NMFS plans to consolidate all regulations pertaining to the Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fishery.102 
2. Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act 
The Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act has been the primary source of 
regulations pertaining to the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.103 Although 
the United States signed an international convention to protect the 
Atlantic bluefin tuna in 1966, it did not pass legislation to implement 
the agreement until 1975.104 As a result, there was no legislative 
authority in the United States to carry out the provisions of the 
treaty.105 The Secretary of Commerce made an initial attempt to assert 
some control over tuna fishing by proposing to list the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act of 
1973.106 Congress reacted to this suggestion by passing the Atlantic 
'lUnas Convention Act of 1975, which provided the legislative author-
ity necessary for the United States to carry out its treaty obliga-
tions.107 
3. 1995 Amendments to the Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act 
Congress reauthorized and amended the Atlantic 'lUnas Conven-
tion Act with the passage of the Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Authori-
zation Act of 1995.108 The 1995 amendments to the Atlantic 'lUnas 
Convention Act created new requirements for the research and moni-
toring of Atlantic bluefin tunas.109 Congress amended the Act because 
of concerns raised by the National Research Council (NRC)1l0 about 
101 See 64 Fed. Reg. at 31550 
102 See ido This Comment will not examine the implications of this draft plan, except for 
whether the consolidated regulations will satisfy the requirements of the Atlantic Tunas Con-
vention Acto 
103 See 50 CoFoRo § 28501 (1998)0 
104 See So REPo Noo 94-269, at 3 (1975), reprinted in 1975 UoSoCoCoAoNo 742, 742-430 
105 See ido at 5, reprinted in 1975 UoSoCoCoAoNo at 7440 
106 See ido 
107 See ido, reprinted in 1975 UoSoCoCoAoNo at 7530 
108 See So REPo Noo 104-91, at 3,16 (1995), reprinted in 1995 UoSoCoCoAoNo 425, 428, 441. 
109 See ido at 17, reprinted in 1995 UoSoCoCoAoNo at 441. 
110 The NRC is an independent group that advises the federal government on scientific and 
technical questions of national importanceo See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, 1998 CON-
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)1l1 quality 
control and leadership over the scientific assessment and monitoring 
of highly migratory species.112 
The 1995 amendments direct the Secretary of State113 to develop 
and implement a comprehensive research and monitoring program 
with the goal of supporting both the conservation and management 
of Atlantic bluefin tuna.114 This research and monitoring program 
provides for, among other things, the collection of "comparable real-
time data on commercial and recreational catches and landings 
through the use of permits, logbooks, landing reports for charter 
operations and fishing tournaments, and programs to provide reliable 
reporting of the catch by private anglers."115 Congress designed the 
research and monitoring program to identify and define Atlantic blue-
fin tuna stocks and to encourage the establishment of a comprehen-
sive international and monitoring effort.u6 A further objective of the 
research and monitoring program is the effective monitoring of 
United States fishing activity.1l7 
SERVATION DIRECTORY 175 (43d ed. 1998). The Council is jointly administered by the National 
Academies of Sciences and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine. See id. The NRC inves-
tigated the stock structure of the Atlantic bluefin tuna and in 1994 concluded that "available 
scientific evidence was consistent with a single stock, two spawning area hypothesis." S. REP. 
No. 104-91, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 425, 429. 
111 NOAA was created within the Department of Commerce on October 3,1970. See CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY, FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 446 (9th ed. 1999). NOAA's goal is to 
promote global environmental stewardship and to describe and predict changes in the Earth's 
environment. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 110, at 15. In carrying out 
this goal, NOAA participates in a number of projects, which include conducting oceanic and 
atmospheric research and managing living marine resources and the marine environment. See 
id. 
112 See S. REP. No. 104--91, at 17, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 425, 442. 
113 Although the statute gives the Secretary of State the responsibility for enforcing the 
Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act, the Secretary of State has delegated this responsibility to the 
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, De-
partment of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R. § 285.1(a) (1998). 
114 See Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Authorization Act of 1995, 16 U.S.C. § 971i(b) (1994 & Supp. 
III 1997). 
115 [d. § 917i(b)(2)(E). 
116 See S. REP. No. 104-91, at 17, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 425, 442. 
117 See id. 
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C. Domestic Implementation of IGGAT Recommendations 
The Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act authorizes NMFS to implement 
ICCAT recommendations.u8 NMFS implements ICCAT recommenda-
tions through the use of a quota system.U9 These quotas are binding 
for any Atlantic bluefin tuna caught, retained, possessed, or landed 
by fishers or vessels subject to u.s. jurisdiction.120 NMFS enforces 
these quotas through the use of fishing permits.12l The type of fishing 
permit issued by NMFS determines the size and number of tuna that 
a fisher may harvest.122 Any owner of a vessel that fishes, either 
commercially or recreationally, for Atlantic bluefin tuna must obtain 
a permit.123 There are six types of permits available: (1) General; (2) 
CharterlHeadboat; (3) Angling; (4) Harpoon Boat; (5) Purse Seine; 
and (6) Incidental Catch.124 The permit category determines the size 
and number of Atlantic bluefin tuna that fishers may harvest125 as well 
as their ability to sell the harvested tuna.126 
Fishers from the United States harvest Atlantic bluefin tuna for 
both commercial and recreational purposes.127 Commercial fishing is 
fishing for the purposes of barter or sale of any fish harvested.128 The 
other type of fishing, recreational fishing, is fishing for purposes other 
than the selling or bartering any of the fish harvested.129 The Angling 
category is for purely recreational fishing. ISO All permit categories, 
except for the Angling category, are commercial categories, meaning 
that fishers may sell the fish that they catch.13l Commercial fishers 
may only harvest Atlantic bluefin tunas from the large-medium and 
giant size classes. l32 Thus, it is illegal for anyone to sell or barter 
Atlantic bluefin tuna smaller than the large-medium size class.133 
118 See 16 U.S.C. § 971d(c). 
119 See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,905, 32,906 (1992). 
100 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 285.22, 285.31(a)(3) (1998). 
121 See id. § 285.21(b)(2). 
122 See id. § 285.24. 
123 See id. § 285.21(a). 
124 See id. § 285.21(b)(I). 
125 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.24. 
126 See id. § 285.31(a)(15),(34). 
127 See BURKE, supra note 21, at 20l. 
128 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.2. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. § 285.24(d). 
131 See id. §§ 284.24(d)(2), 285.34(a). 
132 See id. §§ 285.2, 285.24(d). 
133 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.34(a). 
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IV. ICCAT PROTECTION OF JUVENILE ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA 
In 1981, ICCAT adopted stringent conservation measures for the 
western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. 1M One aspect of this recovery 
plan focused on the protection of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.136 
ICCAT implemented this plan after its Standing Committee on Re-
search and Statistics (SCRS) concluded that the stock of adult Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna had become depleted to very low levels and was 
expected to decrease further. 136 The SCRS also determined that 
fishing mortality for juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna had generally in-
creased to levels that existed before there were regulations.137 This 
pattern of increased fishing mortality of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna 
reduced the potential for increase in the overall stock of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna. 138 
In an attempt to stem the decline of the Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishery, the SCRS recommended, in 1981, that catches of juvenile 
bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic be reduced to as close to zero as 
possible in the 1982 fishing year.139 This meant an ICCAT recommen-
dation prohibiting the taking and landing of Atlantic bluefin tuna 
school sized or smaller.140 
ICCAT member nations followed this recommendation and, begin-
ning in 1982, restricted catches of Atlantic juvenile bluefin tuna.14l 
These countries reasoned that the recovery of the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna fishery depends on the protection of prespawning juvenile fish.142 
Starting in 1992, ICCAT gave the United States permission to catch 
juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.143 ICCAT limited the landing of juvenile 
fish to eight percent of the total annual U.S. allocation of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna.144 ICCAT, however, required the United States to deny 
economic gain to any fisher catching juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.145 
134 See 57 Fed. Reg. 17,872, 17,873 (1992). 
136 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,873. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 ICCAT regulations specifically limit the capture of Atlantic bluefin tuna weighing less than 
30 kilograms to no more than eight percent by weight of the total bluefin catch on a national 
basis. See ICCAT, sutyra note 96. 
143 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,873. These are Atlantic bluefin tuna smaller than school size. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
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NMFS implemented this regulation of denying economic gain by 
banning the sale of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.146 However, in its 
implementation of ICCAT's recommendation, NMFS also banned the 
sale of Atlantic bluefin tuna smaller than 178 cm (70 inches), thereby 
protecting more fish than the ICCAT recommendation required.147 
Thus, there may be no sale of Atlantic bluefin tuna smaller than the 
large-medium size category.l48 Furthermore, to satisfy the no eco-
nomic gain requirement, NMFS limited the catch of bluefin tuna 
smaller than 115 cm (45 inches) to the Angling category alone as 
fishers with Angling category permits may not sell any of the tuna 
they catch, regardless of size.149 In setting these limitations on sale of 
the juvenile fish, NMFS reasoned that this would protect all the 
immature six-year-old fish as well as some of the immature seven-
year-old fish. 150 
Therefore, under these regulations, no one may catch and retain 
young school Atlantic bluefin tuna for any purpose.151 Only fishers in 
the Angling category may catch juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna (school 
to small-medium sized), but they may not sell any of these tuna.152 On 
the other hand, commercial fishers, those from the remaining catego-
ries, may only catch large-medium and giant sized tunas.153 Finally, 
fishers from the Angling category may catch larger fish, but they may 
not sell any of these fish, even if they are large-medium or giant 
sized. 154 
One of the reasons for this ban on the sale of juvenile Atlantic 
bluefin tuna was to reduce the fishing mortality rate on prespawning 
juvenile bluefin tuna.155 NMFS banned the sale of juvenile Atlantic 
bluefin tuna after the United States had exceeded its allocation of 
juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna for seven consecutive years.156 From 
146 See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,905, 32,908 (1992). 
147 See id. 
148 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.34(a) (1998). 
149 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,908. There is one exception to this rule as vessels from the Purse 
Seine category are allowed one percent per trip incidental catch of Atlantic Bluefin smaller than 
178 centimeters. See 50 C.F.R. § 285.22(d). 
150 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,908. 
151 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.31(a)(33). 
152 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,908. 
163 See id. 
154 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.31(a)(15). 
155 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,908. 
156 See Affidavit of James S. Beckett 'V 12, Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. 
Supp.2d 189 (D. Mass. 1998) (No. 97-12297-WGY) (Former ICCAT SCRS Chair and ICCAT 
Commissioner). 
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1985 to 1991 the United States exceeded its quota of juvenile Atlantic 
bluefin tuna, sometimes by as much as three times its allocation.157 
However, after the ban was implemented in 1992, the United States 
continued to exceed its quota in 1993, 1995, and 1996.158 In addition to 
allowing an overharvest of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna in these 
years, NMFS has unlawfully set future quotas without accounting for 
these overharvests.159 For example, the 1996 Angling quota was 253 
metric tons, while the total catch was at least 362 metric tons; never-
theless NMFS unlawfully set the 1997 quota without compensating 
for this overharvest.16o 
Despite the ICCAT recommendation to protect juvenile Atlantic 
bluefin tuna by denying economic gain, the United States increased 
the recreational quota of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna from 126 met-
ric tons to 219 metric tons.161 The United States then increased this 
quota again in 1997 to 265 metric tons and in 1998 to 269 metric tons.162 
Therefore, the United States has continued to exceed an increasingly 
larger quota each year since 1992.163 
A. Domestic Regulation of the Recreational Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
Fishery 
NMFS currently uses two methods to monitor the recreational 
fishery.l64 One of these methods is a telephone reporting system.165 
Under this system, recreational permit holders must call a toll free 
number and report landings of Atlantic bluefin tuna to NMFS.166 This 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
169 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. Supp.2d 189, 198 (D. Mass. 1998). 
NMFS's own regulations require it to subtract the overharvest in one year from the category 
quota for the next year. See 50 C.F.R. § 285.22(h) (1998). Therefore, since there was an overhar-
vest of 109 metric tons in the Angling category in 1996, NMFS should have reduced the 1997 
quota by 109 metric tons. See id.; Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 198; This 
means that NMFS should have set the 1997 Angling category quota at 156 metric tons, rather 
than the 265 metric tons set by NMFS. See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 
198; 50 C.F.R. § 285.22(h); 62 Fed. Reg. 35,107, 35,107 (1997). Furthermore, the 265 metric ton 
quota was an increase over the 253 metric ton quota for 1996. See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 
31 F. Supp.2d at 198; 62 Fed. Reg. at 35,107. 
160 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 198. 
161 See Affidavit of James S. Beckett, supra note 156 ~ 15. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 193. 
165 See id. at 194. 
166 See id. 
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telephone reporting system is then supplemented by the Large Pe-
lagic Survey (LPS).167 The LPS consists of three complementary sur-
veys:168 (1) a weekly telephone survey of boat captains and vessel 
owners;169 (2) dockside surveys of charter operators;170 and (3) a mark-
recapture survey.l7l The results of all these surveys are used to esti-
mate the total catch.172 
Chief among the many problems with this monitoring system is that 
it does not supply the real-time data mandated by the 1995 Amend-
ments to the Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act, nor does it provide the 
real-time data needed by NMFS to manage the fishery effectively.173 
Congress does not specifically define real-time data in the Act.174 
However, the Senate Report states that one of the goals of the pro-
gram is to "effectively monitor U.S. fishing activity."176 Nevertheless, 
the program that NMFS enacted under this statute resulted in over-
harvests of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna in 1996.176 Therefore, at the 
very least, real-time data is data that NMFS should receive soon 
enough to close the fishery before an overharvest occurs; otherwise 
there is no effective management of the fishery. 
Rolland Schmitten, director of NMFS, acknowledged the draw-
backs to the lack of real-time data in An Open Letter to Bluefin Tuna 
Anglers.177 The problem with the system is that the states collect the 
data and then transmit it to NMFS.178 This results in a delay of up to 
two weeks from the actual catch before NMFS has a count of the 
catch.179 The LPS is also highly inaccurate because marina operators 
often refuse to allow the interviewers on site to conduct the exami-
167 See id. 
168 See id.; NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, BLUEFIN TuNA CATCH ESTIMATES AND 
THE LARGE PELAGIC SURVEY: 1996 PROCEDURES AND ISSUES 2 (1996). 
169 NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, supra note 168, at 1. NMFS uses the telephone 
survey to obtain fishing effort information. See id. 
170 Id. NMFS uses the dockside survey to collect information about the catch. See id. 
171 Id. NMFS uses the mark-recapture survey to obtain information about the total landing 
of large pelagic species, such as the Atlantic bluefin tuna. See id. 
1'12 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 194. 
173 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, Director, National Marine Fisheries, An Open Letter 
to Bluefin 'lUna Anglers (available at <http://www.usatuna.comlopenltr.asp>). 
174 See 16 U.S.C. § 97li (1994 & SUpp. III 1997). 
175 S. REP. No. 104-43, at 17, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 425, 442. 
176 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 196. The overharvest for 1996 was at 
least 109 metric tons. See id. at 197. The 1996 data is the most recent data available at the time 
of pUblication. 
177 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
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nations, and captains of some private and charter vessels also refuse 
to cooperate with the interviewers. ISO 
The 1996 Atlantic bluefin tuna season highlighted the problems 
with the two-week delay of the current NMFS management system. lSI 
During 1996, there was an unanticipated abundance of Atlantic bluefin 
tuna early in the fishing season that resulted in an extremely high 
number of catches.I82 The result was that fishers in North Carolina 
alone caught almost the entire Angling quota for the entire year by 
the time NMFS closed the fishery,I83 virtually excluding all Angling 
permit holders from northern coastal states from any chance to take 
tuna that year. However, if real-time data had been available, NMFS 
would have been able to close the North Carolina fishery sooner, 
thereby allowing fishers in other states to catch Atlantic bluefin 
tuna. 184 
As a result of high catch rates off of North Carolina, illustrated by 
the 1996 Atlantic bluefin tuna season, NMFS promulgated two rules 
concerning recreational Atlantic bluefin tuna fishing. I85 The first rule 
divides the overall quota of the Atlantic bluefin tuna Angling category 
into north and south regional subquotas. Is6 Under this division, NMFS 
allocates fifty-three percent of landings to the northern region and 
forty-seven percent of landings to the southern region.IS7 The twin 
goals of this subdivision are to minimize impacts on the northern 
fishery and to increase the scope of scientific monitoring. ISS 
The second rule requires self-reporting of all Atlantic bluefin tuna 
landed under Angling category permits.Is9 The regulation, however, 
180 See Letter from Rebecca Lent, Chief of Highly Migratory Species Management Division, 
to Atlantic Tunas Constituents (June 24, 1997) (on file with the author). 
181 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
182 See id. NMFS periodically opens and closes the fishery so as to allow the quota to be filled 
over the entire fishing season. See 62 Fed. Reg. 44,423, 44,423-24 (1997). NMFS both closes and 
opens the fishing seasons by placing notices in the Federal Register. See, e.g., id.; 62 Fed. Reg. 
53,577,53,577 (1997). A problem with this system is that there is little or no notice of the closure 
of the fishery. For example, in 1997, the projected attainment of the quota was August 18 and 
NMFS closed the fishery on August 18; however, it was three days before the notice of the 
closure was published in the Federal Register. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 44,423-24. 
183 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
184 See id. 
186 See 62 Fed. Reg. 30,741, 30,741 (1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 9726, 9726 (1997). 
186 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,741. 
187 See id. The northern region consists of New Jersey and states north, while the southern 
region consists of Delaware and states south. See 62 Fed. Reg. 19,296, 19,298 (1997). 
188 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,741. 
189 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.29(f) (1998). 
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does not define a method for self-reporting, but rather allows for 
"alternative reporting procedures."l90 These reporting procedures 
may include: telephone, dockside, or mail surveys; mail-in or phone-in 
reports; tagging programs; or mandatory fish check-in stations.191 The 
regulation also states that "[a] statistically-based sample of the An-
gling category permittees may be selected for these alternative re-
porting programs."192 This provision suggests that NMFS will con-
tinue using telephone reporting and the LPS as its primary means for 
monitoring the recreational Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. 
In addition to these rules, NMFS has implemented a pilot program 
in North Carolina that uses a tag and report system to monitor the 
recreational bluefin tuna fishery in North Carolina.193 Under this pro-
gram there must be a landing tag affixed to any Atlantic bluefin tuna 
before it is removed from a vessel.194 Captains or operators of permit-
ted vessels obtain landing cards by completing a Catch Card at a 
Bluefin Tuna Reporting Station.195 The Catch Card contains the date 
of landing, vessel name and type, permit number, and length of each 
fish caught.196 
B. Domestic Regulation ojthe Commercial Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
Fishery 
NMFS's management of the commercial Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishery stands in stark contrast to its management of the recreational 
fishery.197 To begin with, real-time data is available within the com-
mercial fishery as dealers must report the receipt or sale of each 
Atlantic bluefin tuna within twenty-four hours.19s NMFS monitors 
Atlantic bluefin tuna through the use of a tag system.199 Upon arrival 
in a port and immediately upon offloading an Atlantic bluefin tuna 
from any vessel, a dealer must insert a tag into the tuna.200 There is 
190 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,745. 
191 See id. 
192 Id. 
193 See USA 'lUna, USATUNA.COM (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.ooJ.comlfishing/tuna/ 
docslharvesUetter.html> . 
194 See id. 
196 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
198 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.29(a) (1998). 
199 See id. § 285.30. 
200 See id. § 285.30(c)(1). 
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a unique number on each tag so as to distinguish the purchase of one 
Atlantic bluefin tuna.201 This unique tag number remains on the tuna 
until the tuna is cut into portions.202 In the event that the tuna parts 
are subsequently repackaged, the tag numbers must be recorded on 
the outside of any package as well as on any document accompanying 
the shipment.203 It is illegal to be in possession of any large-medium 
or giant Atlantic bluefin tuna that does not have a tag.204 
In addition to tagging every large-medium and giant Atlantic blue-
fin tuna landed, dealers must submit a daily reporting card to the 
NMFS Regional Director.205 The vessel permit holder or operator 
must sign the card immediately upon transferring the fish to a 
dealer.206 This card allows for the verification of the name of the vessel 
that landed the fish and the vessel's permit number.207 The permit 
reporting card contains the tag number affixed to the fish by the 
dealer, the date landed, the port landed, the weight, curved fork 
length, gear used, and location where the fish was caught.208 Dealers 
must also submit a bi-weekly report to the NMFS Regional Direc-
tor.209 The bi-weekly report contains the tail tag number, weight of 
fish, price per pound, nature of sale, and destination of the fish.210 The 
purpose of this reporting system is to improve the management and 
monitoring of the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.2l1 
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ATLANTIC TuNAS 
CONVENTION ACT 
There has been only one case in which a court has examined 
NMFS's interpretation and implementation of the Atlantic Tunas 
Convention Act.212 In this case, the Massachusetts Audubon Society 
argued that NMFS's management of the recreational fishery did not 
satisfy the real-time data requirement of the Atlantic Tunas Conven-
201 See id. § 285.30(e). 
200 See id. § 285.30(d). 
203 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.30(d). 
204 See id. §§ 285.30(c)(2), 285.31(b). 
205 See id. § 285.29(a). 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.29(a). 
209 See id. § 285.29(b). 
210 See id. § 285.29(b )(1). 
211 See 58 Fed. Reg. 45,286, 45,286 (1993). 
212 See generally Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. Supp.2d 189 (D. Mass. 
1998). 
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tion Act.213 The judge, however, disagreed with this argument and 
held that NMFS's management was not inconsistent with a direct 
Congressional command and "there is no indication in the record that 
the law requires more accuracy and better reporting than the Agency 
has been able to devise."214 
The Massachusetts Audubon Society also argued that NMFS had 
failed to deny economic gain from the landing of juvenile Atlantic 
bluefin tuna.215 Again, however, the judge disagreed with the Massa-
chusetts Audubon Society and held that: (1) NMFS's interpretation 
of the ICCAT recommendation was reasonable since economic gains 
were not realized directly by the fishers; and (2) there will always be 
unavoidable economic consequences if fishers are allowed to land the 
fish.216 
VI. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF NMFS's ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 
NMFS promulgated the previously discussed regulations under the 
Atlantic 'llinas Convention Act, but NMFS has also proposed a 
fishery management plan for the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery that will 
address the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and in doing 
so will consolidate all the Atlantic bluefin tuna regulations.217 As pro-
posed, the fishery management plan makes no changes to the current 
management system in either the commercial or recreational Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fisheries.218 NMFS will still manage the commercial 
fishery through the use of a tag and report system.219 While there is 
no specific system of management listed for management of fishers in 
the Angling category, the fishery management plan continues to allow 
statistically based sampling and phone-in reporting.220 
213 See id. at 195. 
214 [d. 
215 See id. at 194. 
216 See id. at 199. As of publication, the Massachusetts Audubon Society is appealing these 
rulings. 
217 See 64 Fed. Reg. 3154, 3154 (1999). This Comment will not address whether the fishery 
management plan satisfies the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The proposed 
fishery management plan is only being considered to examine whether NMFS is planning to 
change its interpretation of the Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act or its implementation of ICCAT 
recommendations. 
218 See id. at 3176-77 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.5) (proposed Jan. 20, 1999). 
219 See id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.5(b)(2» (proposed Jan. 20, 1999). 
220 See id. at 3177 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.5(d» (proposed Jan. 20,1999). 
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The proposed fishery management plan also makes no changes to 
the implementation of the ICCAT requirement that there be no eco-
nomic gain to those landing juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.221 There is 
still a ban on selling tuna smaller than the large-medium size.222 How-
ever, there is no ban on charter boats landing juvenile Atlantic bluefin 
tuna,223 thus some economic gain from the landing of these juvenile 
fish is taking place. To say that the charter boat entrepreneurs are 
the ones making the profit, not the anglers themselves, is to make a 
pedantic distinction that misses the whole point of the provision-re-
moving incentives to take juvenile fish. 
VII. LACK OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE RECREATIONAL 
ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TuNA FISHERY 
Fisheries are resources that are a part of the global commons and 
may be exploited by any nation.224 The Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is 
an example of an exploited fishery resource where the stock of adult 
fish has become depleted to very low levels.225 This resource is similar 
to Hardin's pasture in that it is a resource open to all.226 There is, 
however, one important difference between the Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishery and Hardin's pasture: there are attempts to limit the exploi-
tation of the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.227 ICCAT recommendations 
are outside regulations on the use of Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery 
resources that help stop the exploitation of the resource. 
A. Denial of Economic Gain from Landing Juvenile Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna 
"A recommendation approved and adopted by the Commission, 
however, is not self-executing; of itself it has no force of effect."228 
ICCAT recommendations do not suffice to stop the exploitation of the 
Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery; individual nations must effectively im-
plement the recommendations. 
221 See id. at 3187 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.31(a)(I» (proposed Jan. 20, 1999). 
222 See 64 Fed. Reg. at 3187 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.5(a)(I» (proposed Jan. 20,1999). 
223 See id. at 3182 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.23(c)(3» (proposed Jan. 20, 1999). 
224 See Hopfl, supra note 20, at 137. 
225 See 57 Fed. Reg. 17,872, 17,873 (1992). 
226 See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. 
227 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.24 (1998). 
228 Hoover, supra note 36, at 16. 
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One example of NMFS's failure to implement ICCAT recommenda-
tions effectively as required by the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act is 
seen in its implementation of the requirement that there be no eco-
nomic gain from landing juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna. This is also an 
example of an overall problem with the ICCAT recommendation sys-
tem, which is that there is no assurance that a member nation will 
effectively implement or enforce a recommendation that it has 
adopted. 
ICCAT attempted to reduce the fishing mortality rate for juvenile 
Atlantic bluefin tuna through a ban on the sale of small-medium sized 
fish.229 ICCAT required the denial of economic gain from the harvest-
ing of Atlantic bluefin tuna smaller than 115 cm (45 inches).23o NMFS 
responded to this recommendation by promUlgating a stricter regu-
lation.231 This stricter regulation banned the sale of Atlantic bluefin 
tuna smaller than 178 cm (70 inches), which is the small-medium class 
size.232 
The problem is that NMFS has not effectively implemented the 
recommendation, and has even admitted this failure.233 
[A]llocation of the reduced quota cannot ignore the current state 
of the fishery and the economic reliance that has built up since 
1983 in the angling sector. It is true that this sector of the fishery 
and its support industries would not have developed so substan-
tially had NMFS been able to keep the angling category within 
its quota over the last decade. The fishermen in this category and 
support industries violated no law-their economic dependence 
on the fishery must be considered.234 
This admission illustrates that the existence of regulations does not 
guarantee their enforcement. 
In Massachusetts Audubon Society, however, the court held that 
NMFS's interpretation of the ICCAT recommendation was permissi-
ble.235 NMFS argued that the ICCAT recommendation "allows eco-
nomic gain to someone, just not the fisherman."236 In this sense, the 
allowance of any fishing results in unavoidable economic effects such 
229 See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,905, 32,908 (1992). 
230 See id. 
231 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.31(a)(34). 
232 See id. 
233 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,907. 
234 See id. 
235 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. Supp.2d 189, 199 (D. Mass. 1998). 
236 ld. 
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as the purchase of fuel, tackle, and bait by fishers.237 Regardless of the 
court's ruling, the current system offers little protection of juvenile 
Atlantic bluefin tuna, as harvest levels are equal to those that existed 
before regulation.238 
Despite the court's decision that this is a permissible construction 
of the NMFS's mandate, NMFS has nonetheless failed to implement 
the ICCAT recommendation that there be no economic gain from 
harvesting juvenile Atlantic bluefin tunas.239 NMFS itself argues that 
a complete ban on landing any juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna would 
create an adverse economic impact that would outweigh any conser-
vation benefit.240 In this argument, NMFS implicitly admits that it is 
weighing economic concerns against the recovery of the Atlantic blue-
fin tuna. However, the ICCAT rebuilding program only emphasizes 
the protection of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.241 Therefore, ifprotec-
tion is the goal, there should be no cost-benefit analysis as the recom-
mendation states that the goal is protection. Furthermore, this imple-
mentation does not satisfy the ICCAT goal of protecting juvenile 
Atlantic bluefin tuna and there have been. more juvenile Atlantic 
bluefin tuna caught after NMFS implemented the ICCAT recommen-
dation.242 
B. Lack of Real-Time Research and Monitoring 
The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act also contains mandatory duties 
that NMFS must implement in its management of the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna fishery.243 Congress added these duties in its 1995 Amendments 
to the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.244 One of the duties mandated 
by Congress is the use of a research and monitoring program that 
includes the collection of comparable and real-time data so as to 
support the conservation and management of the Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishery.245 
The United States, acting through NMFS, uses two different re-
search and monitoring systems.246 NMFS uses a tag and report sys-
237 See id. 
238 See supra Section V and accompanying notes. 
239 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 199; 57 Fed. Reg. 32,905, 32,907 (1992). 
240 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 199. 
241 See 57 Fed. Reg. 365, 370 (1992). 
242 See supra Section IV and accompanying notes. 
243 See Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 971i(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
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tem in the commercial fishery247 and a combination of a telephone 
reporting and statistical analysis for the recreational fishery.248 The 
difference between these systems is the delay before NMFS receives 
the data it needs to manage the fishery.249 NMFS knows the status of 
the commercial catch within twenty-four hours, but there is a two-
week delay before NMFS knows the status of the recreational 
catch.250 The two-week delay in the recreational fishery causes other 
problems because, under current regulations, NMFS may not close 
the fishery until it has estimated that fishers have caught the quota.251 
A further problem with the system in the recreational fishery is that 
it can not handle rapid changes of large catches as shown during the 
1996 season in North Carolina.252 
On the other hand, the tag and report system used in the commer-
cial fishery has been much more effective for monitoring and manag-
ing fishing because it is simple and direct.253 The other benefit is that 
it provides real-time data, meaning data within twenty-four hours of 
the catch.254 NMFS has successfully implemented such a system with-
in the commercial Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.255 
NMFS's implementation of ICCAT recommendations within the 
recreational fishery has been ineffective because the harvest of both 
small and medium Atlantic bluefin tuna has generally increased.256 In 
the case of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna, the harvest level is higher 
than it was prior to ICCAT regulations.257 In fact, on average, the 
United States was 200 metric tons per year above its allocation of 
juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.258 Furthermore, had the United States 
kept within its allocation of juvenile tuna, projections show that the 
spawning stock in 1995 would have been double its actual size.259 
An increase in recreational fishing is the cause, because NMFS 
limits commercial fishers to harvesting only Atlantic bluefin tuna from 
the large-medium and giant size classes.26o This decrease in smaller 
247 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.29(a) (1998). 
248 See id. § 285.29(f); NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, supra note 168, at 1. 
249 See Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
250 See id. 
251 See id.; 50 C.F.R. § 285.20(b). 
252 Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
253 [d. 
254 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.29(a). 
255 See id. § 285.30. 
256 See 57 Fed. Reg. 17,872, 17,873 (1992). 
257 See Affidavit of James S. Beckett, supra note 156, ~ 12. 
258 See id. ~ 13. 
259 See id. 
260 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.22 (1998). There is, however, a provision for Purse Seine permit holders 
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fish has reduced the potential for an overall increase in the stock, 
because there are no tuna left to mature.261 
The increase in the harvest of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna, to 
levels that existed prior to ICCAT regulations, provides evidence that 
there is a problem with the management method in the recreational 
fishery, because only recreational fishers may harvest juvenile Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna.262 Congress addressed this deficiency in its 1995 
Amendments, which specifically list a requirement for real-time data 
collection in both the commercial and recreational fishery.263 This real-
time data is to be gathered through the use of log books and landing 
reports.264 NMFS's program, however, uses neither real-time data, nor 
logbooks or landing reports.265 
The one court that has examined this issue noted that the 1995 
Amendments reflected a level of dissatisfaction with NMFS's efforts 
to manage the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.266 Nevertheless, the court 
held that there was "no indication that Congress intended to impose 
a tagging program like that in the commercial fishery, to the exclusion 
of statistical evidence."267 The court, however, never addressed the 
fact that current harvest levels of juvenile tuna are equal to those 
that existed before regulation. 
that provides for an incidental take of Atlantic bluefin tuna less than the large-medium size 
class. See id. § 285.24(d). NMFS limits the incidental take to one percent, by weight, of the 
overall take of Atlantic bluefin tuna in a single trip. See id. Furthermore, the permit holder may 
not sell these fish and NMFS counts them against the Purse Seine category quota. See id. 
Despite some taking of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna in the Purse Seine category, this taking 
has little effect on juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna mortality for two reasons. First, the quota 
allocation for the Purse Seine category has been decreasing, unlike the Angling category where 
NMFS has increased the quota allocation. See, e.g., id. § 285.22(c) (setting Purse Seine quota at 
250 mt); 50 C.F.R. § 285.22(c) (1995) (setting Purse Seine quota at 301 mt); 50 C.F.R. § 285.22(c) 
(1991) (setting Purse Seine quota at 295 mt); Affidavit of James S. Beckett, supra note 156, , 15 
(stating that NMFS has continually increased the Angling quota. NMFS increased the quota to 
219 metric tons from 126 metric tons in 1992, 265 metric tons in 1997, and finally to 269 metric 
tons in 1998). Second, NMFS has not allowed quota overages in the Purse Seine category to the 
degree that they have occurred in the Angling category. See Affidavit of James S. Beckett, supra 
note 156" 12; National Marine Fisheries Service, Landings (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www. 
st.nmfs.gov/webplcommlplsqVwebst1/mCgear _landings.results>. 
261 See 57 Fed. Reg. 17,872, 17,873 (1992). 
262 See 50 C.F.R. § 285.31(a)(37). 
263 See Atlantic 'lUnas Convention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 97li(b)(2)(E) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
264 See id. 
265 Letter from Rolland Schmitten, supra note 173. 
266 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. Supp.2d 189, 195 (D. Mass. 1998). 
267 [d. 
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C. Effect of the Proposed Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fishery 
Management Plan 
There also seems to be little prospect of this management system 
changing as the proposed Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery management 
plan keeps the same regulations in both the commercial and recrea-
tional fisheries.268 Therefore, even if the proposed fishery management 
plan satisfies the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, it must 
still satisfy the requirements of the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act, 
as both of these acts regulate the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.269 
Furthermore, each act has its own separate requirements, meaning 
any fishery management plan for the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery 
must satisfy each individual act's requirements.27o 
Since the proposed fishery management plan contains no changes 
in the recreational fishery regulations that incorporate the use of 
real-time data, the plan does not satisfy the requirements of the 1995 
Amendments to the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.271 Furthermore, 
there has been no change to the regulations that implement the 
ICCAT recommendation that there be no economic gain from the 
landing of juvenile Atlantic bluefin tuna.272 The regUlations in the 
proposed fishery management plan still allow economic gain to third 
parties, such as charter boat operators.273 Therefore, the proposed 
fishery management plan does not satisfy the requirements of the 
Atlantic Tunas Convention Act, and thus does not solve the problems 
discussed above. 
CONCLUSION 
International management of highly migratory species is the most 
effective way to avoid a tragedy of the commons. In the Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fishery, ICCAT has provided the directive standards nec-
essary for effective international management. In order for ICCAT's 
management protocols to be effective in actual practice, it must rely 
on member nations' efforts to implement and enforce those standards. 
Under the administration of NMFS, differences between the regula-
268 See supra Section VI and accompanying notes. 
269 See Massachusetts Audubon Soc'y, 31 F. Supp.2d at 192-93. 
270 See supra Section lILE and accompanying notes. 
271 See supra Section VI and accompanying notes. 
272 See supra Section VI and accompanying notes. 
273 See 64 Fed. Reg. 3154, 3187 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 635.31(a)(1) (proposed Jan. 
20,1999). 
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tion of commercial and recreational Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries 
illustrate the political pitfalls and difficulties in achieving good faith 
implementation of ICCAT goals. The tag and report system currently 
used in the U.S. commercial fishery is very effective as it provides for 
real-time data and practicable enforcement mechanisms necessary for 
effective management of fishery resources. But NMFS has shied 
away from applying the same measures to the recreational fishery. 
This comparison of the commercial and recreational Atlantic bluefin 
tuna fisheries illustrates the need for more coherent implementation 
of ICCAT recommendations and allocations. The recreational Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fishery, however, is an example of an ineffective imple-
mentation of the recommendations. The most effective system is a tag 
and report system that provides the real-time data necessary to man-
age fishery resources. 
The measure of success ultimately must not be whether an agency 
merely stays clear of immaterial administrative nonaction, but rather 
whether the constantly increasing threats to fish stocks are halted, 
and reversed, in the factual realities of the seas. 
